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deepest downturn in the global economy since World War II, hitting 
in particular economies open to trade and integrated with the global 
financial system, including Korea.  During the recession and the 
ongoing recovery, labor market dynamics have differed widely 
across countries.  This paper analyzes the determinants of labor 
market dynamics in Korea and other advanced economies during the 
recent crisis, focusing in particular on the role played by institutions, 
the nature of the shock hitting countries, and policy measures.  It is 
found that institutional factors such high employment protection and 
low unemployment benefits tend to mute the responsiveness of 
unemployment to changes in output.  Policy responses, including 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent global financial crisis or ―Great Recession‖ led to the deepest 
downturn in the global economy since World War II.  It particularly hit 
economies open to trade and integrated with the global financial system, 
including Korea.  However, the global economy is now recovering and Korea 
is at the forefront of the rebound, having benefited from a strong policy 
response, the normalization of international trade, and the return of investor 
risk-appetite.  
During the ―Great Recession‖ and the ongoing recovery, labor market 
dynamics have differed widely across countries.  Some countries, such as the 
United States and Spain, have seen significant job losses and steeply rising 
unemployment rates, while others, including Korea, Japan, and Germany, 
have experienced more muted dynamics for employment and unemployment. 
What explains this divergence in labor market dynamics?  
This paper analyzes the determinants of labor market dynamics across a 
diverse set of advanced economies, including Korea, during recessions and 
recoveries over the past 50 years.  In particular, the paper focuses on the 
importance of institutional factors such as the degree of employment 
protection, the generosity of unemployment benefits, and the share of 
temporary workers.  It also focuses on the role played by the ―nature‖ of 
recessions in determining labor market dynamics.  For example, what are the 
implications if a recession was caused by a financial crisis and/or the bursting 
of a housing-market bubble?  Also, do pre-conditions such as soundness of 
corporate balance sheets matter?  Further to this, the paper analyzes the role 
played by policies in Korea and other countries, focusing in particular on 
government employment programs during the ―Great Recession.‖  
Based on this analysis, the outlook for employment during Korea’s 
ongoing recovery is assessed and some preliminary policy implications are 
drawn.  On the latter, the paper discusses the exit strategy from the 
employment support programs implemented by the Korean government 
during the crisis.  Furthermore, it briefly discusses policy options to support 
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employment growth and enhance labor market flexibility over the medium 
term, including the scope to reduce employment protection legislation, adjust 
the focus of training and education to be more in line with future needs, and 
other steps to reduce the duality in the Korean labor market.   
 
 
2. LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS DURING THE “GREAT  
RECESSION” 
 
Korean labor markets did not escape the adverse spillovers from the recent 
global economic downturn, but the impact was cushioned by policy measures 
(figure 1):  
 Labor force.  Between June 2008 and December 2009, the labor force 
participation rate declined from 61.5% (seasonally adjusted) to 60.5% 
(seasonally adjusted), but then increased as workers re-entered the labor 
market to take up jobs offered under government work programs.  The initial 
drop in the participation rate was most pronounced for women and workers 
with lower levels of education.  They typically take up a larger share of 
temporary jobs and, in the latter case, lower skilled jobs and, therefore, are 
more likely to face layoffs and lack of job opportunities when a downturn 
hits.  Among age-cohorts, the younger workers also left the labor market at a 
faster pace during the initial stages of the crisis.  However, many of these 
more ―vulnerable‖ groups have since returned to the labor market in 
conjunction with the introduction of the government work programs.  
However, the overall participation rate remains below pre-crisis levels, 
currently standing at 61% (seasonally adjusted).  
Employment.  Employment losses from the downturn were particularly 
concentrated in financial services, manufacturing and other cyclically 
sensitive sectors exposed to the adverse spillovers from the global crisis.  
However, the government’s job creation program and other measures 
introduced in response to the crisis saw employment in public administration, 
education, and social services rise by close to 500,000 between June 2008 
Leif Lybecker Eskesen 234 
and August 2009, almost matching the decline in private employment during 
the same period.  These measures, together with the high level of 
employment protection, helped support employment for regular workers 
throughout the crisis.  The job-creation programs also helped support the 
employment of temporary workers, which declined significantly during the 
early stages of the crisis.  On the other hand, the employment of daily 
workers and self-employed declined throughout the crisis.  However, with 
the economic recovery gaining pace, job gains in the private sector have 
picked up in 2010 and are becoming more broad-based.  
Unemployment.  Notwithstanding the decline in labor force participation, 
registered unemployment also took a hit during the first year of the crisis, 
impacting in particular the younger cohorts during the early stages of the 
crisis.  While the government job-creation programs helped cushion the fall 
in employment, a delayed implementation of the latter stage of the program 
led to a temporary spike in the unemployment rate to almost 5% in early 
2010 because labor force participation rose as workers signed up for the 
program.  However, the corresponding increase in public sector employment 
did not take place until a few months later, which then led the unemployment 
rate to fall back again.   
Hours and wages.  During the course of the crisis, the average work-week 
declined by around 3 hours to 44 hours and it has continued to decline in 
recent quarters.  Monthly wages also fell as hours worked and hourly wages 
were cut, declining on an annual basis between December 2008 and 
September 2009 for all industries.  However, the wage growth rate has 
returned to positive territory over the past few quarters.  The initial drop in 
average wages was most pronounced for cyclically sensitive sectors such as 
manufacturing, construction, and financial services.  By employment status, 
non-regular workers saw the largest declines in pay.    
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Figure 1 Korea-Labor Market Dynamics During “Great Recession” 
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 However, the government’s work program 
helped cushion the decline in overall 
employment…..   
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
Employment by Sector
(y/y percent change)
Manufacturing
Construction
Whole sale, retail, hotel and restaurants
Financial services and insurance
 
 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
Employment Growth
(y/y percent change)
Total employment Private employment
 
., and high employment protection forced the 
adjustment to take place more through lower 
hours and wages….  
 …,and to be carried in particular by the non-
regular workers given their relatively lower firing 
costs.    
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
Mar-96 Mar-98 Mar-00 Mar-02 Mar-04 Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-10
Weekly Hours and Changes in Wages
Average weekly hours
Hourly wages: y/y change in percent (RHS)
 
 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Jan-96 Jan-98 Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10
Employment: Regular/Non-regular Workers
(y/y percent change)
Regular workers Non-regular workers
 
Leif Lybecker Eskesen 236 
Compared to the Asian Crisis, the labor market suffered less this time 
around (figure 2).  During the Asian crisis in 1997-1998, the employment 
rate bottomed out close to 10% below the cycle peak, while it during the 
current crisis only declined by 1.5% relative to the peak level.  
Correspondingly, the unemployment rate rose significantly more during the 
Asian Crisis, up by almost 6 percentage points compared to around 1 
percentage point this time around.  The divergence between the dynamics 
during the Asian and the current crisis to a large extent reflects that the 
economic downturn was much deeper in the late 1990s, with GDP per capita 
dropping by close to 10% from peak to trough.  During the Great Recession, 
on the other hand, GDP per capita only fell by around 5% from peak to trough, 
supported by the proactive policy response and the much sounder 
fundamentals of the Korean economy this time around (i.e., stronger balance 
sheet positions of the government, financial institutions, and large 
corporates), making it more resilient to the adverse global spillovers.  
Moreover, wages and hours worked also adjusted more during the current 
crisis, cushioning the impact on employment.  
Korean labor market dynamics diverged from those seen in other advanced 
economies during the current crisis (figure 3).  For example, the employment 
rate fell by 4% less than in the United States and the unemployment rate rose 
by around than 3.5 percentage points less.  This partly reflects that Korea’s 
economy has rebounded faster than the U.S. economy, employment 
protection is higher in Korea, and hours, wages, and participation rates fell 
more, cushioning the impact on employment and (registered) unemployment.  
These were also broadly the reasons why Korean labor markets were less 
adverse impacted than in countries such as Ireland, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom.  However, employment conditions weakened relatively more in 
Korea than in Germany.  This likely owes much to Germany’s higher level of 
employment protection and the German government’s massive expansion of 
a short-term work program.  At the same time, the decline in the employment 
rate and increase in unemployment since the business cycle peak was broadly 
in line with the trend seen in Japan. 
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Figure 2  Korea-Comparing the Asian Crisis and the “Great Recession” 
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Figure 3 Korea-Comparing Korea to Other Countries 
 
Output in Korea declined much faster than in the 
comparator countries during the “Great 
Recession”, but also recovered sooner.  
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However, the adjustment in hours worked….  
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3. WHAT EXPLAINS THE LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS 
ACROSS COUNTRIES? 
 
As the previous section highlighted, the labor market dynamics during the 
―Great Recession‖ differed across advanced economies.  While this partly 
reflected differences in output losses, it would appear that institutional 
factors were also at play.  Moreover, the nature of the shock differed across 
countries, with some countries hit by a multitude of shocks (financial crisis, 
the bursting of asset bubbles, and trade shocks) and others, including Korea, 
primarily hit through the trade channel.  In addition, policy responses varied 
in terms of both magnitude and type of measures.  
 
Figure 4 Change in Unemployment Rate and Output During Crisis 
                     (Change in Percentage Points and Percent, Respectly, Peak 
to Trough) 
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To analyze the respective roles of institutions and the nature of shocks, the 
papers applies Okun’s law as a organizing framework.1)  Okun’s law captures 
the relationship between unemployment and output and can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
,u y      
 
where u  is the change in the unemployment rate,   is the intercept 
coefficient, and   is the elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to 
changes in output.  Based on the estimation of this simple equation for a 
diverse set of advanced economies and using a panel regression setting, the 
paper will assess (i) which institutional factors can help explain the 
difference across countries in unemployment responsiveness to output 
changes and (ii) to what extent the ―nature‖ of shocks has a bearing on labor 
market dynamics during recessions and recoveries (proxied by the forecast 
errors of the estimated Okun’s law).  Finally, we will assess the impact of 
some of the employment programs implemented in a number of countries.  
 
3.1. The Role Played by Institutional Factors 
 
To determine the responsiveness of unemployment to output changes, a 
dynamic version of Okun’s law is estimated for 22 advanced economies, 
including Korea.2)3)  For each country, the dynamic version is estimated for 
the 20 years prior to each recession that the country has gone through based 
on quarterly data.  Given that all countries have experienced at least one 
                                                                
1) The paper follows the methodology used in chapter 3 of the April 2010 IMF World 
Economic Outlook, which was authored by Ravi Balakrishnan, Mitali Das, and Prakash 
Kannan.  
2) The dynamic   captures the long-term impact of changes in output on changes in the 
unemployment rate. 
3) The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.  
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recession over the past 50 years, the estimated equations gives us a set of 
dynamic s  across countries and over time.  The results show that the 
responsiveness of unemployment to changes in output has been higher in the 
years preceding the current crisis than it was in the 1990s.  Moreover, the 
estimated coefficients for the dynamic s reveal large cross country 
differences, with responsiveness very high in countries like Canada and 
Spain, while it is low for countries like Norway and Japan.  For Korea, the 
dynamic   is estimated to be at the low end, especially when controlling for 
crisis periods.  
 
Figure 5 Dynamic Betas for 20 Years Prior to Great Recession 
            (Responsiveness of Unemployment w.r.t. Output) 
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dynamic s  are regressed on a set of institutional factors4) (see table 1, 
equation 1 to 5):   
 
Employment protection.  As expected, the panel regression shows that 
stricter employment protection makes unemployment less elastic to changes 
in output.  This is because the higher costs of firing and hiring makes the 
employer more reluctant to both lay off workers during downturns and hire 
them during upturns.  In Korea’s case, employment protection is relatively 
high by OECD standards despite a decline over the past few decades, which 
helps explain the relatively low dynamic   for Korea.  Moreover, effective 
 
Figure 6 OECD Measures of Strictness of Employment Protection 
                                                                
4) As a measure of employment protection, OECD’s employment protection legislation (EPL) 
index is used and the generosity of unemployment benefits measure the income replacement 
rates. 
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employment protection is typically higher in Korea at the work place than the 
minimum levels prescribed by the law, partly due to strong unions.  
 
Generosity of unemployment benefits.  Theoretically the impact of more 
generous benefits is ambiguous.  During downturns generous benefits can 
limit downward wage flexibility and cause more job losses, while they may 
constrain employment growth during upturns by keeping reservation wages 
relatively high.  The panel regression shows that the former would appear to 
dominate the latter.  Given the relatively low income replacement rates in 
Korea, unemployment benefits would tend to mute unemployment dynamics 
compared to other countries.   
 
Figure 7 Net Replacement Rate of Unemployment Benefits 
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Share of temporary workers.  A priori, a larger share of temporary 
workers should be associated with larger swings in unemployment during 
economic cycles due to the lower degree of employment protection for 
workers with temporary contracts and because employers have sunk less 
investment in them.  Moreover, the increased prevalence of this over time 
should ceteris paribus have augmented this for Korea, which has a very high 
share by OECD standards.  However, while the coefficient has the expected 
sign, it is not significant in any of the panel regressions.  
 
Figure 8 Share of Temporary Workers (in Percent) 
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Table 1 Determinants of Unemployment and Employment 
Responsiveness to Changes in Output 
 
Unemployment Equation 
Employment 
Equation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Strictness of 
Employment 
Protection 
–0.05 
[0.050] 
  
–0.08 
[0.007] 
–0.07 
[0.007] 
–0.13 
[0.03] 
Generosity of 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
 
0.14 
[0.193] 
 
0.37 
[0.001] 
0.40 
[0.000] 
0.44 
[0.003] 
Share of 
Temporary 
Workers 
  
0.005 
[0.148] 
 
0.005 
[0.334] 
0.01 
[0.134] 
Constant 
0.41 
[0.000] 
0.36 
[0.000] 
0.23 
[0.000] 
0.64 
[0.000] 
0.59 
[0.000] 
0.72 
[0.00] 
Number of 
Observations 
70 66 59 48 39 34 
R
2
 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.27 0.49 0.33 
Note: IMF staff estimates. 
Source: p-value are presented in square brackets. 
 
to changes in economic activity.  Reducing the strictness of employment 
protection legislation (equivalent to half the current level of Korea’s current 
EPL index) would increase the elasticity of unemployment and employment 
(with respect to output) from –0.21 to –0.29 and 0.41 to 0.56, respectively, an 
increase of close to 40%.  Aligning Korea’s unemployment benefits and 
share of part-time workers with the OECD average would also raise elasticity 
noticeably.  A combination of lowering employment protection (cut in half), 
while raising unemployment insurance (to OECD levels), would increase 
elasticities of unemployment and employment by more than 50%.  
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Figure 9 Policy Simulations: Impact on Dynamic Beta’s, Unemployment 
Figure 10 Policy Simulations: Impact on Dynamic Beta’s, Employment 
 
3.2. The Role Played by the Nature of the Recession 
 
Each recession is different and has different implications for the depth of 
the labor market shock and the speed of recovery in employment.  While this 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Impact on Beta
Policy Simulations: Impact on Dynamic Beta's, Employment
Cut EPL to half of current level
Reduce EPL to Oecd average
Raise unemployment benefits 10 percent above current levels
Raise unemployment benefits to Oecd average
Reduce share of temporary contracts to OECD levels
Change EPL to half of current level and unemployment benefits to Oecd levels
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Impact on Beta
Policy Simulations: Impact on Dynamic Beta's, Unemployment
Cut EPL to half of current level
Reduce EPL to Oecd average
Raise unemployment benefits 10 percent above current levels
Raise unemployment benefits to Oecd average
Reduce share of temporary contracts to OECD levels
Change EPL to half of current level and unemployment benefits to Oecd levels
Labor Market Dynamics in Korea — Looking Back and Ahead 
 
247 
Table 2 Unemployment Dynamics During Recession not Explained  
by  Changes in Output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Financial 
Crisis 
0.73 
[0.000] 
      
Financial  
Stress 
 
0.21 
[0.045] 
–0.59 
[0.019] 
  
0.26 
[0.019] 
0.20 
[0.085] 
Financial Stress 
X Corporate  
Leverage 
  
0.03 
[0.003] 
    
Bursting of 
Housing Bubble 
   
0.09 
[0.000] 
 
0.08 
[0.000] 
0.07 
[0.002] 
Stock Return  
Dispersion 
    
0.52 
[0.078] 
 
1.09 
[0.007] 
Constant 
0.21 
[0.032] 
0.12 
[0.346] 
0.04 
[0.735] 
0.06 
[0.658] 
0.29 
[0.007] 
–0.17 
[0.241] 
–0.28 
[0.059] 
Number of 
Observations 
352 259 156 314 334 235 234 
R
2
 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.11 
Note: IMF staff estimates. 
Source: p-values are presented in square brackets. 
 
clearly depends on the size of the economic downturn, the nature of the 
shock hitting the economy can also have an impact on the labor market 
dynamics during the recession and recovery phases.  
To analyze the role played by the nature of recessions, a two-stage 
approach is applied.  First, we compare the actual change in unemployment 
during previous recessions and recoveries for each country to the changes 
predicted by the estimated Okun law relationships.  Second, these forecast 
errors, controlled for output changes, are then regressed on different shock 
types associated with previous recessions using a panel data setting (table 2 
and table 3):
 5)
 
                                                                
5) This again follows the approach used in chapter 3 of the April 2010 IMF World Economic 
Outlook. 
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Table 3 Unemployment Dynamics During Recoveries not Explained  
by  Changes in Output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Financial  
Crisis 
0.20 
[0.097] 
      
Financial  
Stress 
 
0.11 
[0.047] 
0.29 
[0.102] 
  
0.11 
[0.056] 
0.11 
[0.097] 
Financial Stress 
and Corporate 
Leverage 
  
0.00 
[0.188] 
    
Bursting of 
Housing Bubble 
   
–0.01 
[0.384] 
 
–0.02 
[0.144] 
–0.02 
[0.173] 
Stock Return  
Dispersion 
    
0.03 
[0.822] 
 
0.04 
[0.842] 
Constant 
–0.18 
[0.032] 
–0.10 
[0.041] 
–0.07 
[0.268] 
–0.12 
[0.077] 
–0.15 
[0.005] 
–0.05 
[0.531] 
–0.06 
[0.474] 
Number of 
Observations 
520 389 279 462 467 373 365 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Note: IMF staff estimates. 
Source: p-values are presented in square brackets. 
 
Financial shocks.  Historical evidence points to the protracted nature of 
recessions and recoveries following financial shocks.  Using a financial crisis 
dummy with a value of 1 during recessions and recoveries accompanied by 
financial crisis, shows that financial shocks have implications for labor 
market dynamics.  According to the panel regression results, the 
unemployment rate would be around 0.7 percentage points higher during 
recessions associated with financial shocks and about 0.2 percentage points 
higher during recoveries.  Other measures of financial shocks, including a 
financial stress index, also suggest that unemployment will be higher during 
down-cycles associated with high financial distress, especially if there are 
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also balance sheet vulnerabilities such as high corporate leverage.6)  
Sectoral shocks.  A sectoral shock could be the bursting of a housing 
market bubble, which would primarily have a direct impact on the 
construction sector.  However, it is also likely to have broader implications 
for households through wealth effects and the financial sector through 
solvency effects.  A panel regression shows that a dummy variable with the 
value 1 during crisis accompanied by the initial bursting of a housing bubble 
can help explain a higher level of unemployment during the recession phase 
but not during the recovery phase.  Another measure of sectoral shocks could 
be the dispersion in stock market returns across economic sectors, with a 
high level of dispersion indicating prevalence of sector-specific shocks. 
Including this measure in the regression confirms that sectoral shocks do tend 
to amplify the unemployment shock during recessions, but during recoveries 
the coefficient on dispersion is not significant.   
These results also help explain why Korea was less hit this time around 
than during the Asian crisis and why Korea fared relatively better compared 
with other countries.  During the Asian crisis, unlike this time around, the 
economy was hit by a dual financial and housing market shock.  Moreover, 
the corporate sector was highly leveraged while, at least the large corporates, 
entered the recent crisis with strong balance sheets.  Factoring in the 
relatively higher level of financial stress during the Asian crisis and the 
bursting of the housing market bubble can alone explain 2 percentage points 
(or most) of the difference in the change in the unemployment rate during the 
recession phases of the two crisis.  During the current crisis, Korea, unlike 
the United States, did not face a banking crisis and a housing market collapse.  
In addition to the relatively lower responsiveness of unemployment to 
changes in output in Korea’s case, this can explain around 0.75 percentage 
points of the difference between the change in the U.S. and Korean 
unemployment rates during the ―Great Recession‖.  
                                                                
6) The financial stress index used here was developed by Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Lall.  See for 
example, Journal of Financial Stability, 2010, forthcoming. 
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Figure 11 Explaining Different Unemployment Outcomes  (Percentage  
           Point Contribution to Change in Unemployment Rate) 
 
3.3. The Role Played by Government Employment Programs 
 
During the recent downturn, a number of advanced economies introduced 
short-term work programs to cushion the impact from the economic 
slowdown on employment.  Countries making use of these programs 
included France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, and the United States.  There 
was a significant expansion in these programs early on during the crisis in 
both Germany and Japan, which saw the intake soar to 3.5% and close to 4% 
of the labor force, respectively.  In the United States and Italy the increase 
was less pronounced, which partly reflected design features making it less 
attractive for employers to use the programs and for workers to participate.  
In Korea’s case, the government in the 2009 original and supplementary 
budget introduced various measures to support employment, both through 
subsidies and temporary public work programs.  Aggregating employment in 
public administration, education, health, and social services, the increase in 
public employment in Korea during the first three quarters of 2009 accounted 
for close to 2.5% of the labor force.  
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Difference between Asian Crisis and Great 
Recesssion
Difference between Korea and the US 
during Great Recession
Explaining Different Unemployment Outcomes
(Percentage point contribution to change in unemployment rate) 
Contribution from housing bubble
Contribution from financial stress
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Figure 12 Employment Work Program (in Percent of the Labor Force) 
 
These programs can, therefore, also help explain the ―unpredicted‖ change 
in unemployment during the crisis.  While the economic slowdown, rising 
financial stress, and the housing markets busts (in some of the countries) can 
help explain a significant portion of the increase in actual unemployment 
from peak to trough during the recent downturn, there is still an unexplained 
portion.  Indeed, in some countries, including Korea, Germany, and Italy, the 
predicted change in the unemployment rate by Okun’s law exceeds the actual 
change and the expansion in the job programs in the latter two countries can 
explain some of this.  In Korea’s case, however, the public job expansion did 
not start until after the trough of the crisis in end-2008 and, therefore, only 
help explain the forecast errors during 2009.  
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Figure 13 Explaining Change in the Unemployment Rate (Peak-to-  
                       trough and Peak to end-2009 Change in Percentage Point) 
 
 
4. WHAT DO THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS SUGGEST FOR 
THE EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK? 
 
Employment is likely to pick up with the rebound in the Korean and global 
economy, although the recovery may prove protracted.  Korea’s economy has 
rebounded impressively since the recession in the second half of 2008 and is 
at the front-line of the global recovery.  This has already been reflected in an 
improvement in labor market conditions, including a pick-up in employment 
across sectors and professions.  However, the economic growth momentum is 
expected to slow in coming quarters, partly as a ―technical payback‖ for the 
fast recovery and as macroeconomic stimulus is scaled back.  
Even so, employment in Korea is predicted to grow faster than in most other 
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Figure 14 Model Predicted Employment Recoveries 
                                    (Employment q/q SAAR divided by GDP q/q SAAR) 
 
advanced economies, but this also reflects faster growth.  Scaling the 
employment growth predicted by the estimated Okun laws with expected 
GDP growth, shows that the employment gains are less buoyant in Korea.  
This is in line with the estimated lower dynamic beta in Korea’s employment 
equation.   However, these predictions do not factor in that employers may be 
somewhat cautious about hiring due to lingering uncertainty about the 
economic outlook.  Also, they do not factor in the potential impact from a 
gradual scale-back in public employment programs in Korea and other 
advanced economies.  
Absent some of the labor market rigidities caused by institutional factors, 
employment could have recovered faster.  If Korea’s employment protection 
level had been lower and unemployment benefits had been higher, 
employment would have declined more during the crisis, but would also have 
picked up much faster during the recovery.  Comparing the through-cycle 
prediction of employment growth using the dynamic beta estimated for 
Korea with the employment growth predicted if employment protection had 
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been half its current level and unemployment benefits in line with OECD 
levels (resulting in a higher beta), suggests that the overall employment level 
would end up much higher in the latter case.  In addition, panel regressions 
show that annual employment growth in Korea (and other countries), 
controlling for output growth, could have been 0.15 percentage points higher 
in the past for each 1 point decline in OECD’s employment protection index 
and 0.36 percentage point higher for each percentage point increase in the 
income replacement rate of unemployment benefits.  For Korea, this 
corresponds to additional employment of 350,000 and 850,000, respectively, 
over a 10 year period.  However, the positive coefficient on the income 
replacement ratio should be interpreted with caution.  It may simply pick up 
the fact that some countries with high income replacement ratios have 
institutional features supporting labor market flexibility, including a low 
level of employment protection, decentralized wage-setting, etc.  Indeed, if 
both employment protection and unemployment benefits are included as 
explanatory variables for employment growth, they turn out to be insignificant. 
 
Figure 15 Model Predicted Employment (Growth q/q SAAR (LHS)  
and Cumulative Change in Persons (RHS)) 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Korea’s economy and labor markets were hit by the ―Great Recession‖, 
but the job losses were lower than in the past and elsewhere.  When the 
adverse spillovers from the global economic and financial crisis hit the 
economy during the second half of 2008, employment declined, especially in 
the more cyclically sensitive sectors and for non-regular workers.  However, 
the job losses were smaller than during the Asian crisis, which partly 
reflected the smaller output loss but also a larger adjustment this time around 
in wages and hours worked.  The latter also partly explains why job losses 
were less severe in Korea than in many other countries during the ―Great 
Recession‖.   
Institutional factors also explain the small increase in Korean 
unemployment during the recent crisis compared to trends in other countries.  
Korea’s unemployment rate rose by a mere 0.1 percentage point between the 
pre-crisis cyclical peak in June 2008 and the trough of the crisis in December 
2008.  In fact, regression analysis reveals that the responsiveness of 
unemployment to output changes is relatively low in Korea compared to 
elsewhere, especially when controlling for crisis episodes.  Based on a cross-
country panel regression using advanced economies, it is found that the low 
responsiveness in Korea can partly be explained by the high level of 
employment protection, which is particularly high for regular workers.  It 
also partly relates to the relatively low level of unemployment benefits in 
Korea.  Further to these institutional factors, Korea’s labor markets fared 
relatively well because the economy entered the crisis with sound 
fundamentals and was not, unlike other countries hit, by both banking crisis 
and the bursting of housing market bubbles.  Moreover, the Korea 
government took decisive steps to counter the adverse fallout from the crisis 
through macroeconomic stimulus and an expansion of employment programs.  
To avoid a ―job-light‖ recovery, the authorities should manage the 
unwinding of policy support measures carefully and take further steps to 
increase labor market flexibility.  While the rebound in economic activity in 
Leif Lybecker Eskesen 256 
Korea has been impressive so far, macroeconomic and labor market policies 
have played an important part.  These will, therefore, have to be scaled back 
carefully to safeguard the recovery in the labor market, although it will 
important to ensure that the work programs do not become permanent 
features and restrain private-led employment growth.  In this context, it will 
also be important to step up efforts to reduce the high level of employment 
protection for regular workers.  While it reduces the decline in employment 
during a crisis, panel regressions suggests that it also slows the subsequent 
recovery and, more generally, has a negative impact on employment growth.  
Furthermore, the high level of employment protection has served to amplify 
dualism in the labor market, which leaves the non-regular workers more 
exposed during downturns, raising precautionary savings given the limited 
access to unemployment benefits.  It also gives employers less incentives to 
invest in on-the-job training for the large share of non-regular workers (more 
than 1/3), with likely negative implications for potential growth.  Reducing 
employment protection, especially for regular workers, should go hand in 
hand with an enhancement in social protection programs to help lessen the 
income losses during unemployment and smooth consumption.  Moreover, to 
help raise employment and give non-regular workers a foothold, further 
efforts are likely needed to strengthen training and education efforts, 
including by targeting these efforts more on what it demanded by 
employers.   
  
 
APPENDIX 
 
The description of data sources methodology in this Appendix borrows 
from chapter 3 of the IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2010. 
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A1. Data Sources 
 
Table A1 Data Sources 
Descriptor Source 
Employment 
Labor Force 
Unemployment Rate 
Real GDP 
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
Unemployment Benefits  (Average 
Replacement Ration for First Two 
Years) 
Share of Temporary Workers 
Hours per Employee 
Sectoral Stock Market Returns 
OECD,
1)
 Labor Force Statistics 
OECD, Labor Force Statistics 
OECD, Labor Force Statistics; Haver Analytics 
GDS (Raw Data from Haver Analytics) and 
CEIC for Korea 
OECD 
IMF Structural Reform Databse 
 
 
Eurostat, OECD 
Haver Analytics, National Sources 
Datastream and CEIC for Korea 
Note: 1) OECD=Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
 
A2. Business Cycles 
 
This paper employs a ―classical‖ approach to dating business cycles by 
focusing on turning points in the level of output rather than deviations from a 
trend.  The procedure — based on Harding and Pagan (2002) — uses a set of 
statistical criteria to determine the window over which an observation is 
classified as a local peak or trough and to determine the minimum duration of 
a complete cycle and the minimum duration of a phase of a business cycle.  
In this paper, the observation window is set at two quarters, the minimum 
duration at five quarters, and the minimum phase at two quarters.  Although 
the criteria for the minimum duration of a cycle and a phase are occasionally 
binding, the procedure generally dates the start of a recession as the quarter 
during which output is higher than the two quarters preceding and following 
it.  This implies that a period of two quarters of negative growth is a 
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sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a recession.  Likewise, the end of 
a recession is generally marked as the quarter during which output is lower 
than the two quarters before and after it.  With these criteria in place, local 
peaks and troughs are identified, which define recessionary and expansionary 
phases of the business cycle. 
 
A3. Stock Market Dispersion 
 
Measure of Stock Market Dispersion The measure of dispersion in stock 
market returns follows Loungani, Rush, and Tave (1990).  Stock market 
returns at the sectoral level for each country are obtained from Datastream. 
The data generally begin in the early to mid-1970s.  For each country i, the 
time series of the stock market dispersion measure ( )tSD  is computed as 
follows: 
 
1/ 2
2
1
( ) ,
N
it nt nt tN
SD w R R

     
  
where ntw  is the share of total market capitalization of sector n in quarter t, 
ntR  is the quarterly return on the sector n index, and tR  is the total market 
quarterly return.  To minimize large fluctuations in sectoral weights, the 
average share of market capitalization over the previous 10 years was used. 
 
A4. Okun’s Law and Dynamic Beta 
 
For each recession episode in a particular country, a dynamic version of 
Okun’s law is estimated using quarterly data for the 20-year period leading 
up to the peak in output just before the start of the recession.  The general 
form of the equation that is estimatedis as follows: 
 
1 2
0 1 0
,
p pq
R
t i t i i t i i t i t
i i i
u y u D y      
  
             
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where u  and y  refer, respectively, to the change in the unemployment 
rate and the level of output growth.  RD  is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if the economy is in a state of recession.  The use of the dummy 
variable allows the coefficients related to the responsiveness of changes in 
the unemployment rate to output growth to take on different magnitudes 
depending on the state of the business cycle.  To allow for different dynamics 
across countries, the lag lengths ( 1 2,  ,  and p p q  in the specification above) 
are chosen using a Bayesian information criterion for each country and each 
episode.  For most countries and episodes, the criterion suggests the use of 
fewer than two lags.  The procedure used to estimate the Okun’s law 
equation for changes in employment is carried out in a similar manner, with 
the change in log employment as the dependent variable. 
To demonstrate how the dynamic beta ( )  is derived, we use the example 
of one lag on output and unemployment.  This gives the following expression 
for Okun’s law: 
 
0 1 1 1 1 ,t t t t tu y y u               
 
The dynamic beta (DB) measures the long-term impact of a one-unit 
change in output growth on the change in unemployment.  Based on the 
specification above, the dynamic beta can be written as follows: 
 
0
0 1 1 1 1
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When there is a one-unit change to output growth during period t and no 
change during other times, the equation reduces to: 
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The summation in the last term can be written as: 
 
1 1
0 0
 .t s t t s
s s
u u u
 
   
 
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Assuming that the there is initially no change in unemployment (i.e., 
1 0tu   ), we get: 
 
0 1 1 .DB DB      
 
Rearranging then gives the expression for the dynamic beta: 
 
0 1
1
.
1
DB
 




 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler, ―Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business 
Fluctuations,‖ American Economic Review, 79, March 1989, pp. 14-
31. 
Boeri, Tito and Jan van Ours, The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Cardarelli, Roberto, Selim Elekdag, and Subir Lall, ―Financial Stress and 
Economic Contractions,‖ Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming, 
2010.  
Harding, Don and Adrian Pagan, ―Dissecting the Cycle: A Methodological 
Investigation,‖ Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(2), 2002, pp. 365-
381. 
International Monetary Fund, ―World Economic Outlook, April 2009,‖ 
Washington D.C., 2009. 
____________, ―World Economic Outlook, April 2010,‖ Washington D.C., 
Labor Market Dynamics in Korea — Looking Back and Ahead 
 
261 
2010. 
Knotek, Edward S., ―How Useful Is Okun’s Law?,‖ Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Economic Review,  Fourth Quarter 2007, pp. 73-103. 
Loungani, Prakash, Mark Rush, and William Tave, ―Stock Market 
Dispersion and Unemployment,‖ Journal of Monetary Economics, 
25(3), 1990, pp. 367-388. 
Moosa, Imad A., ―A Cross-Country Comparison of Okun’s Coefficient,‖ 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 24(3), 1997, pp. 335-356. 
Okun, Arthur M., ―Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Significance,‖ 
American Statistical Association, proceedings of the Business and 
Economics Statistics Section, Alexandria, Virginia: American 
Statistical Association, 1962.  
Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff, ―Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Crisis 
So Different? An International Historical Comparison,‖ NBER 
Working Paper No. 13761, Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. 
Sharpe, Steven A., ―Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage, and the 
Cyclicality of Employment,‖ American Economic Review, 84(4), 
1994, pp. 1060-1074. 
 
 
